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	 Game theory is applicable to various spheres of human activity. The sphere of economic relations might be the one using it extensively.Much economic interaction involves negotiations on a variety of issues. Wages and prices of other commodities (such as oil, gas,  computer chips, etc.) are often the outcome of negotiations amongst the concerned parties. Bargaining is ubiquitous. What variables (or factors) determine the outcome of negotiations? Bargaining theory seeks to address the above question and many other real-life questions concerning bargaining situations.
	A bargaining situation is a situation in which two or more players have a common interest to cooperate, but have conflicting interests over exactly how to co-operate. There are two main reasons for being interested in bargaining situations. The first practical reason is that many important and interesting human interactions are bargaining situations. The second, theoretical reason is that understanding such situations is fundamental to the development of an understanding of the workings of markets and appropriateness, or otherwise, of prevailing monetary and fiscal policies.
	The main issue that confronts the players in a bargaining situation is the need to reach agreement over exactly how to co-operate. But each player would also like to reach an agreement as favorable  to him/her as possible. It is thus possible that the players will strike an agreement only after some costly delay or fail to reach it. Both cases might be highly undesirable.
	A main focus of any theory of bargaining is on the efficiency and distribution properties of the outcome of bargaining. The former property relates to the possibility that the players fail to reach an agreement, or that they reach it after some costly delay. The distribution property relates to the issue of exactly how the gains from co-operation are divided between the players. 
	Besides above mentioned characteristics of the bargaining outcome there are  several other factors effecting it.The principles of bargaining theory determine the roles of various key factors on the bargaining outcome. They influence a player’s bargaining power. These factors are enumerated below.
1. In most real-life situations the bargaining process is not frictionless. It is  very time-consuming and time is valuable to the players. This fact may lead the negotiators to become impatient. But impatience works against the player.. A player’s bargaining power is higher the less impatient  this player is relative to the other negotiator. Patience confers bargaining power.
2.   Another potential source of friction in the bargaining process comes from the possibility that the negotiations might breakdown into disagreement because of some uncontrollable factors. There is always risk present in bargaining process.Even if the possibility of such an occurrence is small, it nevertheless may provide appropriate incentives to the players to compromise and reach an agreement. A player’s bargaining power is higher the less averse he\she is to risk relative to the other negotiator. 
3. In many bargaining situations the players may have access to ‘outside’ options and\or ‘inside’ options, the attractiveness of which influences the players` bargaining power. A key principle is that a player`s outside option will increase his/her bargaining power if and only if the outside option is sufficiently attractive.This is the so-called outside option principle (OOPS). A basic important message is that a negotiator should not let himself/herself be influenced by threats or promises that are empty. Only credible threats and credible promises matter.A negotiator`s inside option is the payoff obtained during the bargaining process- i.e. while the parties to the negotiations are in temporary disagreement.But when one player`s outside option is sufficiently attractive, both players` inside options have no impact on the bargaining outcome.
4. The role of commitment tactics involves a negotiator taking actions prior to and\or during the negotiations that commit her\him to some favorable bargaining position. Such commitments are partial in that they are revocable, but revoking a partial commitment can be costly. That`s why they are still component to be taken into consideration.
5. An important determinant of the outcome of bargaining is the extent to which information about various variables (or factors) are known to all the parties in the bargaining situation.
	The above aspects of negotiations (as well as some others:  procedure and format of negotiations, reputation of a player, populism, etc.)
apply to various bargaining situations, and can be used by leaders, cheaf executives, strategic planners and policy advisers in modeling various economic situations.
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